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THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ACQUISITIONS
IN JAPAN: TAKEOVERS AND TABOO
I. INTRODUCTION
The development of mergers and acquisitions activity in Japan has
been receiving considerable international attention. While the Japanese
have been freely investing on a global scale for quite some time, the
investment opportunities in Japan have remained limited for foreigners.'
Although the 1979 revision of their Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade
Control Law ("FECL") was widely touted as a liberalization of restrictions
on foreign investment, significant restrictions still remain.
2
The FECL is written vaguely and leaves great ambiguities in its
application.
3  
Under the FECL, the Japanese ministers retain broad
discretion in interpreting and enforcing its provisions This broad
discretionary power has continued to hinder foreign investment in Japan.
5
Moreover, structural and cultural barriers, which have been internationally
criticized,
6 
have continued to constrain foreign investment in Japan.
7 
As
the Japanese involvement in mergers and acquisitions grows, the traditional
rationalizations become more untenable and the pressures for reform
increase.'
This note will discuss the various benefits of acquiring Japanese
corporations, the historical background and practical application of the
FECL, and the cultural and structural barriers that inhibit foreign invest-
1. Michiko t. Crarnpe & Nicholas E. Benes, Majority Ownership Strategies for Japan, 1
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 41, 41 (1982).
2. ld
3. Id.
4. See id. at 43.
5. Hisako Muranatsu, Note, Prying Open the Japanese Market: Tender Offers and the
Legal System in Japan, It Loy. L.A. INTL & Come. LJ. 579, 585-92 (1989).
6. Id. at 604-10.
7. Id.
8. David Sanger, Worries About Reaction in U.S.. Japanese Assess Investment Policy, N.Y.
TiI Es, Nov. 24, 1989, at Al.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INTfL & COMP. L.
ment in Japan. Finally, this article will examine Japan's increasing
participation in merger and acquisition both at home and abroad.
II. BENEFITS OF ACQUISITION
The advantages of acquiring an established business in Japan are
numerous when compared with the conventional method of establishing a
business.
9 Often, one of the primary goals of acquiring a target corporation
is to capitalize on the undervalued market price of a corporation's stock.
Another is to increase the profitability of a corporation when the present
management is perceived to be inefficient.'
0 In Japan, however, there are
additional incentives for acquiring established corporations." Acquiring an
established business in Japan may be the only feasible way for a foreign
investor to penetrate the intensely competitive and sophisticated Japanese
market.'
2 
Start-up costs for new businesses are extremely high.'
3 
Land for
factories and office space is difficult to obtain and prohibitively expensive
to purchase.'
4 
"Real estate prices in recent years have sky-rocketed in
Japan, making prime office space literally unavailable."
5 It is difficult for
foreigners to gain entry into the Japanese distribution systema, which are
quite complicated and often closed to "outsiders.""
a 
Distributors and
subcontractors are often closely aligned with the Japanese companies with
whom they have established relationships. It is equally difficult for
foreigners to establish franchises in Japan; the approval of would-be
competitors is usually required.
7 
Moreover, it is very difficult to recruit
9. Id; see Mitsum Misawa, Merger and Acquisition Activities in Japan: the Present and the
Future, 19 VAND. J. TtANSNAVL . 785, 795 (1986). The conventional method of starting a
business from scratch is often refered to as "greenfield investnent"; they buy land, build
factories, acquire any necessary machinery, and hire employees. Id.
10. Michiko L Crampe & Nicholas E. Benes, Note, Adequate Remedies for Tender Offer
Abuse: Resurrecting Manipulation and Reforming the Business Judgement Rule, 9 U. HAW. L.
Rev. 209, 209-10 (1987).
11. James C. Abegglen, Can Japanese Companies Be Acquired?: Why Japan Mistrusts




15. Murmatsu, supra note 5, at 581
16. See id.
17. Japanese Corporate Finance. EUROMONEY, March 1990, at 31. The Japanese take an
adversarial approach to foreign trade. Id. They believe in allocation of franchises rather than
allowing the forces of competition to detennine them. Id In Japan, each franchisee has their
protected niche: their shop, plot of land, or line of business. let For example, if a grocery
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an experienced management group and a high quality labor force because
of the special nature of the Japanese labor market. Generally, Japanese
workers expect to remain employed by the same company throughout their
lives." Finally, it is difficult if not impossible, for foreigners to develop
the necessary relationships with the inner circles of industry associations,
banking groups, and government agencies and officials.
19
Acquisitions enable foreign entrants to avoid many of the obstacles of
establishing a new business. Acquiring a Japanese company yields many
benefits to the newcomer." First, it cuts some of the costs associated with
start-up businesses.
2
' Second, it provides immediate access to an
established management and labor force.' Third, it provides ready access
to valuable technology and facilities.? This has the added benefit of a
potential windfall because Japanese corporations typically understate their
assets, carrying appreciated land on the books at rates significantly lower
than market value.' Fourth, acquiring an established network of relation-
ships with distributors, customers, government agencies and officials, and
other necessary parties is a key factor in Japan; relationships in Japan often
take many years to establish and cultural barriers may hinder the develop-
ment of these relationshipsY Finally, licenses, permits, and government
authorizations may already be established or easier to obtain.m
store owner wanted to open a new outlet, he would have to gain the approval of the other store
owners on the street Id. This could take up to ten years, if possible at all. Id.
18. JAMs C. Aa wot & GOBDuE STALK JR., KAIStA, THn JAPANESE CORPORATION 199-203
(1985). The Japanese labor system is chatucterized by career-long employment, meaning one
is hired in a company for life. Id. Japanese management regard their employees as family, and
the leaders of the corporation (kaisha) often speak of entry into the company as being born
again into another family. Id.





24. See Peter Reynolds, Foreign investment in Japan: The Legal and Social Climate, 18
TEX. INTL L.J. 175, 181 (1983); Kelly C. Crabb, The Reality of Extralegal Barriers to Mergers
and Acquisitions in Japan, 21 INtt. LAW. 97, 99 (1987).
25. Merit E. Janow, Note, Mergers and Acquisitions in Japan: A New Option for Foreign
Companies?, 26 COLUM. J TRANSNATIr L. 573, 574-76 (1988).
26. Id.
449
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INTL & COMP. L.
III. LEGAL ASPECTS OF ACQUISITIONS IN JAPAN
A. Evolution of Japanese Foreign Investment Laws
After World War II, Japan sought to protect Japanese industry and
regulate foreign exchange while it rebuilt its economy." The Foreign
Investment Law of 1950 ("FIL") and the Foreign Exchange and Trade
Control Law of 1949 ("FECL") formed the basis for regulating foreign
investment activity in Japan.' Initially, the FIL and the FECL were
viewed as temporary measures to be terminated once Japan sufficiently had
regained its economic strength." These laws effectively made it impossi-
ble for foreign companies to engage in hostile takeovers.' Miey pdilital
all transactions unless prior "validation" was received by the competent
ministry or ministries"
The FIL and FECL operated on what has been termed the "negative
principle," meaning that any transaction that fell within these laws should
be presumed to have negative economic effects and should be prohibited
unless that presumption was overcome? This placed the burden on the
foreign investor to demonstrate that the transaction was in the best interests
of the Japanese economy and that the particular industry would not
negatively be affected.
3 "Validation was granted only to transactions that
the competent ministry believed would contribute positively to the Japanese
economy, although few were actually validated.
"
'
Between 1963 and 1973, Japan had become a recognized economic
force among the world's developed countries.' Prior to this, Japan had not
been recognized as a formidable competitor; the Japanese markets had not
yet begun to attract significant foreign interest, and there was no real
perception of unfair trade practices in Japan.' This perception began to
27. Allan D. Smith, The Japanese Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law and









35. Reynolds, supra note 24, at 186-87.
36. Id.
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change as foreign pressure increased for Japan to open its markets. 3 In
1964, Japan became a member of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development ("OECD"), which obligated it to liberalize
regulations hindering direct foreign investments.' Japanese restrictions,
however, continued to hinder foreign investment. Pressure on the Japanese
Government for reform was still minimal," but by 1966, Japan's restric-
tions on foreign investment were criticized widely abroad.' In 1967, the
Japanese Government responded to this criticism by introducing the
concept of "automatic validation," which purported to liberalize the foreign
exchange and investment laws.4' Automatic validation, in theory,
addressed the negative principle. It was to be based on objective criteria,
providing a process by which certain sectors of the economy would be
liberalized and certain transactions would be automatically approved.42
Automatic validation had only limited success;43 the process seemed to
apply only to those areas of the Japanese economy that were performing
well." The ministries maintained a great deal of discretionary power and
could impose terms favorable to the Japanese interests. These terms were
often onerous and thus frequently discouraged foreign investment. This
practice continued into the late 1970s. In 1979, the Japanese Government
began to overhaul its foreign exchange and investment laws.
B. The New Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law
The most dramatic changes in the foreign exchange and investment
laws occurred in 1979.' The Japanese Government, under continued
pressure from fellow OECD members, substantially revised the FECL and
abolished the FIL.47 Under the amended FECL, the negative principle
37. Id.
38. PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOINo BUSINESS IN JAPAN 6 (1975).
39. Reynolds, supra note 24, at 187.
40. David Birenbaum & Sharon K. Zackula, Foreign Investment in Japan: Current Limits
and Restrictions, 11 E. ASIAN EXECUTIvE REP. 19 (1988).
41. Smith, supra note 27, at 422.
42. Birenbaum & Zackula, supra note 40, at 19.
43 Id.




N.YL. SCH. J. INTL & COMp. L.
finally was abrogated,
' and all foreign exchange transactions were
presumed to be valid and permissible unless specifically prohibited; the
new FECL operated on a "positive principle."
49 
The purpose of the FECL
was to promote freedom of foreign exchange, foreign trade and other
foreign transactions, and to enable expansion of foreign transactions by
exercising minimum controls and adjustments."i "The revision marked a
de jure level confirmation of the openness of the Japanese market ....
Although the new FECL appeared to shift to a positive principle,
indicating a significant liberalization, the new law has fallen far short of
total liberalization?
2 Under the new FECL, the ministries still retain broad
discretion to issue cabinet orders and notices to create specific exceptions
to the general rule that foreign investment in Japan is permitted.
53
Acquisitions by foreign investors are governed by Chapter V, the
section regarding "Direct Domestic Investments," also known as "inward
investments."' Although "validation," formal approval, is no longer
required, the Minister of Finance ("MOF") and Minister of International
Trade and Industry ("MITI") must be given notification thirty days in
advance before any person or organization falling within the definition of
"foreign investor" may consummate a proposed transaction.
5 
Under the
provisions of Chapter V of the FECL, a foreign investor is defined as:
1. A non-resident natural person."
2. A juridical person or any other organization established
under the laws of a foreign country, or a juridical person or




49. Janow, supra note 25, at 580-81.
50. Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Act, Shoho (Commercial Code), Law No.
65 of 1979, ch. 1, art. 1, 1, [hereinafter FECL; DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN (Zentur Kitagawa
ed., 1980).
51. THE BANK OP TOKYO, LTD., SETINO UP ENTERPRISES IN JAPAN 5 (1984).
52. Crampe & Benes, supra note t,at 4t."The enactment ofJapan's new Foreign Exchange
and Foreign Trade Control Law laid the groundwork for lifting many of the old restrictions on
foreign investnent. This law was widely touted as full liberalization, but it stops far short of
that standard." It Some question whether it has changed anything at all. Id.
53. Smith, supra note 27, at 424.
54. FECL, supra note 50, arts. 26-30.
55. Id.
56. Id. art. 26, 1 1.
57. Id.
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3. A company in which a majority of the shares are held by a
foreign investor as defined in items 1 or 2."
4. A juridical person or any other organization of which a
majority of the officers (including directors) or officers
having the power of representation consists of persons in
item .59
The relevant sections of Chapter V of the FECL define a direct
domestic investment as:
1. The acquisition of shares in any listed corporation, where the
number of shares held by the acquirer plus the number of
shares held by any juridical person or other organization who
is deemed, by a Cabinet Order, to have a special relationship
with the acquirer equals a total of 10% of the listed corpora-
tions outstanding stock.W
2. The transfer or acquisition of shares of any unlisted corpo-
ration. During the thirty-day waiting period, the ministries
review the proposed transaction to determine whether it may
have any adverse consequences."'
Japanese investors are required to file notice ten days before initiating
any tender offers.' The MOF and the other competent ministers, within
whose industry the transaction may fall, may investigate any acquisition
that results in any of the four categories described within the FECL.
Article 27 of the FECL provides that the Ministers may extend the
period in which the acquisition is prohibited up to four months from the
date of receipt of the report where:
1. It might imperil the national security, hinder the maintenance




60. Id. an. 26,12.
61. Id.
62. Muramaau, supra note 5, at 585.
63. FECL, supra note 50, art. 27, 1 1.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INTL & COMP. L.
2. It might have an adverse effect on the activities of similar or
related business enterprises in Japan or impede the smooth
operation of Japan's economy."
3. There are no reciprocal trade agreements or other interna-
tional agreements insuring mutuality, the transaction must be
altered or its execution stopped until those conditions are
eradicated."
4. It should be altered or suspended because Government
permits or licenses are required pursuant to Article 21
involving capital transactions."
The "waiting period" may vary, depending on the nature and
complexity of the transaction. Although the MOF and the minister in
charge of that particular industry may shorten the waiting period, they may
also extend it up to four months if they perceive the proposed investment
to fall within any of the four situations described in Article 27.67 In this
situation the ministers will seek the opinion of the Committee on Foreign
Exchange," which is composed of people of academic experience who are
appointed by the MOF." If the Committee determines that the four-month
period is not enough time to make a determination, it may extend the
period up to five months.?
° 
After consulting with the Committee, the
ministers may modify or suspend the proposed investment.
7
'
While the new FECL purports to liberalize the restrictions on foreign
investment, the changes actually are a "cosmetic" attempt to appease
foreign critics?' Arguably, the FECL liberalizes the procedural restrictions,
but the substantive restrictions remain largely unchanged.'
The Ministers still retain broad discretion to modify or suspend any
proposed acquisition.
74 




67. Id. art. 27, 3.
68. Id. art 27, 2.
69. Crampe & Benes, supra note 1, at 47.
70. FECL, supra note 50, art. 27, 3.
71. Id. art. 27, 2.
72. See Crampe & Benes, supra note 1, at 53.
73. id.
74. R. Murphy, Japan and the World-Power Without Purpose: The Crisis of Japan's
Global Financial Dominance, HARV. Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1989, at 71, 73. The Ministry of
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Ministers wide latitude in determining which transactions fall within Article
27,1 For example, how does one define "smooth operation of Japan's
economy" or "adverse effects on similar or related businesses"? Further-
more, to what extent does a proposed investment "imperil national
security" or "hinder the maintenance of public order or protection of the
safety of the people"? The potential for abuse or political influence is
immense. "To label as 'liberalization' a system that allows officials of the
Ministry of Finance and MITI to impose restrictions whenever they deem
it necessary violates the definition of the word.
" 7
IV. STRUCTURAL AND CULTURAL BARRIERS
A. Administrative Guidance: Gyosei Shido
One of the most difficult concepts for many foreign investors to
understand is Japan's ubiquitous system of administrative guidance, termed
gyosei shido. "The Japanese business system is a hybrid, unique to Japan,
of 'free marker and government involvement."' Administrative guidance
is a term that describes the Japanese Government's method of interpreting
its laws.' It covers a variety of actions by which the administrators
influence investors through extralegal means premised on voluntary
compliance.?
9 
Administrative guidance is widely used to interpret the
FECL.? In the context of acquisitions, it emphasizes consultation between
the foreign investors and the ministry officials."
t 
Although administrative
guidance is not legally binding on the parties, as a practical matter it has
the force of law because a failure to follow the process of gyosei shido
may prejudice the ministry officials who will ultimately issue a formal
recommendation to either modify or suspend the transaction."
Finance still wields enonous power. 1d. The Ministry's atitude is of greater importance to
Japanese banks and insurance companies than the law that dictates what they can and cannot
do. Id.
75. Crampe & Benes, supra note 1, at 45-48.
76. Id. at 53.
77. TsUYOSH FUKUDA, JAPANESE BuSINESS LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 113 (1983).
78. Smith, supra note 27, at 424-25.





456 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INVL & CoMp. L. [Vol. 12
Prenotification discussions are an essential element of administrative
guidance.' Although the FECL provides that notice will be reviewed upon
receipt, the proposed transaction is reviewed substantially prior to the
actual receipt of formal notice through these informal negotiations.'
Furthermore, MITI officials will refuse to accept any notice that does not
provide sufficient information.85 Insufficient information includes a failure
to follow the gyosei shido process and provide additional information when
requested.
6
Generally, the ministry officials will ask about the transaction in more
detail at the consultation or prenotification stage.' If the transaction
involves a novel situation or a designated industry, the ministry officials
will require additional information." If the ministry officials determine
that the proposed transaction violates their interpretation of the FECL, they
will inform the party prior to the formal notification.' If a transaction is
determined to be unacceptable as proposed, the party then has the
opportunity to restructure the transaction on terms more acceptable to the
ministry officials.' This process of consultation and persuasion
(nemawashi)
9
' will continue until a compromise has been reached.' If the
transaction cannot be restructured on terms conforming to the ministry
officials' interpretation of the law, the party is legally entitled to submit
notice without altering the transaction because the ministry has no authority
to reject the transaction prior to notification.
3  
In this sense, formal
notification is a mere formality.
A party cannot challenge the process of administrative guidance
because no formal determination has been issued.' If the party chooses
to ignore the advice of the ministries and submits the proposal without the
recommended modifications (which one is entitled to do), the issuance of
83. Id. at 427-29.
84, Id. at 431,
85. Id.
86 Id.
87, Id. at 430.
88. See id.
89. Id. at 431.
90. See id.
91. Mashiro Kasagi, On Mergers in Japan, 18 MERoRS & AcQursmoNs 6 (1983).
92. Smith, supra note 27, at 431.
93. Kasagi, supra note 91, at 6-10.
94. Smith, supra note 27, at 432-33.
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a formal refusal will form the basis of a legal challenge." This endeavor,
however, will likely be fruitless. The courts generally rely on the advise
of the ministry for their expertise in the given area.'" Furthermore, even
if a plaintiff was successful in a court challenge, it would be of little
benefit. The time it takes to win a lawsuit certainly would provide ample
time for any corporation to set up a successful defense. Even if the
investment were to go through, to start out with a reputation as an
antagonistic, aggressive competitor in Japan's sensitive society where
Westerners are often criticized for their litigiousness would certainly not
be an enviable commencement. Thus, the importance of following the
process of gyosei shido should be emphasized.
B Cross-Shareholding
One of the more significant and pervasive non-legal constraints on
foreign acquisition of Japanese corporations is their pattern of reciprocal
share ownership, usually referred to as "cross-shareholding" or "stable
stockholders.
"
" Prior to World War It, many of the corporations were
members of corporate groups known as zaibatsu.
9 When the zaibatsu
were abolished after World War It, many Japanese corporations joined one
of six newly formed groups called keiretsu.
1
m These industrial groupings
are essentially combinations of companies that cooperate with each other
and provide mutual support.'
0
' One of the essential characteristics of
keiretsu is the extensive cross-shareholding among its members."
4  Each
member usually owns a certain percentage of each other's shares. One of
the fundamental purposes of establishing such close and interdependent
relationships was to achieve mutual protection, mainly from foreign
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Isaac Shapiro, Can the Japanese Lack ofLitigiousness Continue, in LEGAL ASPECTS 'F
DOING BuSINESS IN JAPAN 25-26 (1983).
98. Cmbb, supra note 24, at 97, 105-09.
99. Toshro Nishitnura,Acquisitions In Japan, in L3AL AsPsCrs oF DoN0 BusiNESs IN JAPAN
99 (1981).
100. Janow, supra note 25, at 587.
101. Crabb, supranote 24, at 106-07. Forexample, akeiretsu provides a cooperative effort
in marketing and research and development programs. Id. A keiretsu might consist ofa trading
company (which provides insurance, transpotation. warehousing, and financial services), a
distrbution company, and, in some cases, subsidiaries and subcontractors. Id. These factors
illustrate why the keiretsu is generaly closed to foreign investors. Id.
102. Id.; Nishimura, supra note 99, at 99-100.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INTL & COMP. L.
acquisitions.' Corporations actively sought corporate shareholders who
would be "stable," would not interfere with the management, and were
unlikely to sell to foreigners.l"o Cross-shareholding reinforced these
goals.
0 
Each corporation would influence the way the other corporation's
shares would be voted. In other words, each corporation would retain
control over the shares of its stock that were held by the other corporation
and vice versa. This basic pattern of cross-ownership remains intact
today.' 06 A recent survey by the National Conference of Stock Exchanges
showed that, as of March 1989, 70.5% of the equity of the companies
listed in Japan since 1978 are owned by "stable shareholders." ' 7
Cross-shareholding strongly deters unfriendly takeovers for many
reasons. First, it obviously strengthens the target company's voting
power. 8 A second, less obvious reason is that cross-shareholding
withdraws a large percentage of the stock from active trading, making it
more difficult for a potential acquirer to gain the necessary shares to form
a majority ownership.'0 Due in large part to the elaborate network of
cross-shareholding arrangements, only about a third of the shares on the
Tokyo Stock Exchange are actively traded.
"
' Third, an even less obvious
reason, is that as fewer shares are openly traded (floating shares), the more
expensive they become."' Markets work on supply and demand; if the
103. See Crabb, supra note 24, at 102; Nishimura, supra note 99. at 100 Many listed
corporations were encouraged to seek other corporations as shareholders as a safeguard against
being taken over by foreign investors ld.; Fred Hiatt, U.S. Japan Discuss Econoies: Each
CountryCalls FarBasic Changes, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 199, at CI [hereinafter U.S.-Japanese
Discuss Economies]. The Japanese business structure, marked by its interlocking shareholders,
discourages mergers and acquisitions. Id.
104, Nishimura, supra note 99, at 100.
105. Crabb, supra note 24, at 108. A company whose shares are held by other members of
the group will naturally bereluctant to approve an acquisition of a member when that member
has a reciprocal power to vote its shares. Id.
106. Torrey L. Whitman, The Legal FrameworkforAcquisition in Japan, NATAL L.J., May
10, 19i7, at 36.
107. Tokyo Report Cross-Shareholders Brewing Another Friction, Jiji Press Ticker Service,
Aug. 9, 1989, acailable in LEu1S, Nexis Library, AP File.
108. See id.
109. id.
110. Clay Chandler, Believers in Japanese Stocks Experience a Fiery Baptis., WALL. ST. I,
Jan. 2, 1991, at R7.
Ill. Floyd Norris, Japan's Yen Strategy May Weaken Stocks, N.Y. TIMES, March 21. 1990,
at D. For years the Japanese stocks have looked expensive relative tothose traded in Europe
or the United States, asmeasured by the traditional indicators such as the price-earnings ratios
or their dividend yield. Id.; see Tokyo Report. Cross-Shareholders Brewing Another Friction,
supra note 107; Hostile Takeover Bid Changes Japan Rules, CI TRIt., Aug. 27, 1909, at 11.
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demand increases and the supply remains the same, the prices will rise.




One of the most formidable obstacles confronting the foreign investor
comes in the form of social barriers. It has often been said that lifting the
legal restrictions to foreign investment activity will be of little practical
benefit until the negative stigma, which the Japanese attach to acquisitions,
is relaxed."
3 The Japanese perception of the corporation is much different
than it is in the West. In Japan, the corporation is viewed as existing for
the employees, ensuring their futures and well-being."
4 
Western corpora-
tions are held directly accountable to shareholders for the corporations'
performance, such as stock price, profit, dividends, and growth."
5  In
Japan, corporate management view the shareholders as the providers of
capital, making the corporation's existence possible, and therefore entitling
them to a "reasonable" return."
6 There has often been harsh criticism of
the Japanese perception and treatment of shareholders, and demands for
Because relatively few shams ate actively traded, the prices of many Japanese stocks are
astronomical, making it even more difficult for any one investor to acquire a substantial interest
in a finn. Id.
112. James Stemgold, Banks Balk at Costs of Japan, N.Y. TIMES, March 21, 1990, at Dt.
Some executives in the United States have expressed the opinion that with the astronomical
price-eamings multiples in Japan there is no way that they coald make an acquisition work.
Id; Amy Borms, et al., Who's the Biggest of Them All?, Bus. WK., July 17, 1989, at 139. The
avenge price-earnings ratio for a Japanese company is 100, compared with 21 for companies
in the United States. Id. This serves as an important bulwark against foreign acquisitions;
Japanese stocks are simply too pricey. Id.
113. See Crbb, supra note 24, at 115; Shale, Winning Hearts in Japan Winr Them Abroad
Too, EuROMONEY, Sept 1988, at 18. Yasuhtro Sato, manager of the merchant banking
departnent at Nippon Credit Bank, stated that there are no regulations forbidding the takeover
of Japanese companies by foreign entities, thereis only a difference in culture that inhibits the
growth of mergers and acquisitions in Japan. Id.
114. Ahegglen, supra note 11, at 18.
115. ABEGLEN & STALK, JR., supra note 18, at 184. Western corporations traditionally are
perceived as vehicles for profit optimization, or, at woest, profit maximization. Id.
116. See Abegglen, supra note 11, at 18; David Lake, US Bankers in Tokyo See Problems
in Racer-Thin Margins of Japanese, Am. BANKER, May 13, 1988, at 2. Earnings do not carry
the same significance in Japan as they do in the United States. it Shareholders do not
pressure management to improve returns, and most profits am retained for expansion. Id.
PFithernore, Japanese shareholders do not blame management for poor =turns or a failed
company, they often tend to blame themselves. Id.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
rights similar to those of corporate shareholders of the West have been
growing."
7
Moreover, the labor market in Japan is characterized by a system of
life-long employment."' Typically, the employee is hired directly from
school rather than from the open market." 9 As previously mentioned, the
idea that the corporation is family is a meaningful one in Japan, where an
entire process of socialization generally follows initial entry into the
company.'"o "[Tlhe purchase or sale of a company in Japan has the flavor
of the purchase or sale of people. It is, in short, immoral."' 2'
As an extension of their perception of the corporation as family, the
Japanese regard unfriendly or hostile takeover attempts as deviant
behavior.' 22 Acquisitions in Japan have been likened to "gangsterism."'"
The Japanese use the word notorri to describe the attempted purchase of
a corporation. Notorri translates to hijacking.'l Similarly, the Japanese
117. Walter L. Ames, Buying a Piece of Japan, Inc.: Foreign Acquisitions in Japan, 27
HARv. N' L.J. 541,552 (1986). In Japan, many non-shareholdes or holders of vety few shares
may exercise an inordinate degree of contrnl. Japanese Takeovers: Shareholders Find a Voice,
ECONOMIST, July 29,1989, at 64. In response to a recent statement by Mr. Masahiko Kadotani,
the director-general of the Ministrys Securities Bumau, that issuing shares at lower than market
prie to fend off takeover attempts is not acting in the best interests of shareholders, The
Economist stated that the fact that he recognizes shareholders as having rights is "revolution-
amy.- Id.; see also Karl Schoenberger & Christopher J. Chipllo, Breaking with Tradition:
Japanese Firms Reluctantly Entering Era of Hastile Mergers andAcquisitions, ASIAN WALL ST.
J., Aug. 3, 1987, at 6. Although Japanese companies are expected to act like surrogate families,
the urgent need to rationalize Japanese industry and diversify corporate interests will break
down the old ways. Id. In this article, Mr. Iwao tshizuka, a director for the Japanese Mineba
Corporation, in charge of Mineba's mergers and acquisitions strategies, criticized the traditional
attitudes toward mergers and acquisitions in Japan. Id As Mineba was frustrated in its attempt
to merge with Sankyo Seiki, Mr. Ishizuka expressed dismay over the fact that Sankyo Seiki's
founder and President, Mr. Rokuichi Yamada, was able to thwart off an acquisition despite his
meager 3.5% ownership of the company. Id.
118. WalterL. Ames,Entering the Japanese Market Via Acquisitions, 7E. ASIAN EXECUnVE
REe. 9 (1985). Companies in Japan have been likened to "communal organizations." Id. Large
companies appear to exist for the benefit of the employees who have lifetime ties with the
firms. au
119. Id.
120. ABEGGLEN & STALK,supra note I8; Susan China,Japan's New Goal: U.S. Companies,
N.Y. TimES, Apr. 27, 1988, at Dt. Buying another company defies the traditional tenets of
management in Japan, that the company is a family cemented by carefully nuetured corporate
loyalty. Id. The Japanese view of a company as family still prevails today. Id.
121. Lehner, Japan's Aversion to Selling Companies May Be the Ultimate Barrier to US.
Trade, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 1989, at 28.
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word for acquisition is baighu, which means bribery.'" In Japan, the sale
of a company is perceived as damaging to one's reputation.
26 Injury to
one's reputation may be a primary deterrent to unfriendly acquisitions in
Japan. In a society that holds reputation in such high regard and views
unfriendly takeovers as immoral, or unethical at best, it is easy to see that
concern over one's reputation is sufficient to deter most Japanese business-
men from violating their corporate culture.' It is also easy to understand
why most zaibatsu stand together in preventing foreigners from engaging
in such activities.
V. CASE STUDY: MINEBA CORPORATION THWARTS
TRAFALGAR-GLEN'S ACQUISITION ATTEMPT
An ostensible example of the legal, structural, and social barriers to
foreign investment in Japan is demonstrated with the attempted takeover
of Mineba Corporation by Trafalgar-Glen. In August 1985, Los Angeles
based Trafalgar Holdings Limited announced that it had secured an option
from Glen International Services Company, a London based corporation,
to purchase a twenty-three percent stake in Mineba Corporation, a ball-
bearing manufacturer in Japan, after conversion of warrants and deben-
tures.
2
' Together, Trafalgar Holdings Limited and Glen International
Services Company ("Trafalgar-Glen") announced that they intended to
pursue the acquisition ofMineba.
t ' Ironically, Mineba had just completed
its acquisition of Hampshire Ball Bearings, a United States manufacturer,
and earlier that month Mineba had applied for a merger with Sankyo Seiki
Manufacturing Company ("Sankyo"), a Japanese manufacturer of precision
machinery and electronics equipment.'
30 The chairman of Trafalgar,
Charles Knapp, viewed both Mineba and Sankyo as undervalued because
125. id. Notorri or corporate raider is considered almost a deviant in the Japanese business
community, someone who jeopardizes the system and whose ethics are questionable. Whitman,
supra note 106, at 36.
126. J . Ranaseyer, Takeovers in Japan: Opportunism, Ideology and Corporate Control,
35 UCLA L. REv. I, 16 (1988); M & A in Japan: Halting Steps Toward a New Era, 18
MERGERS& ACQUISITIONS 6 (193). Psychological and cultural gaps are wide. Selling a company
in Japan is a traumatic esperience Id.
127. See Ramseyer, supra note 126, at 16.
128. Mineba Uses the Merger Defense to Fend Off Foreign Takeover, ASIAN WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 4, 1985, at 28 [hereinafter Mineba Uses Merger Defense].
129. Id,
130. Crabb, supra note 24, at 122-23; Misawa, supra note 9, at 786-87; see also Tokyo Gets
Its First Taste of Greenmail, BUS. WK., Sept. 23, 1985, at 56 (indicating Mineba's successful
acquisitions of other Japanese companies).
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because Japanese corporations are not required to disclose current market
values of real estate and other assets."' "Mineba countered Trafalgar's
overtures with a demonstration of the defensive tools available to Japanese
companies against foreign investment." "
To comply with the FECL, foreign investors must file notice with the
MOF if they intend to acquire ten percent or more of a Japanese
corporation and receive the Ministry's approval.' 3' Furthermore, because
Mineba was considered important to Japan's national security (approxi-
mately two percent of Mineba's sales were to the military),' the purchase
of its shares had to be thoroughly scrutinized by the ministries.' 3' In
Mineba's case, the ministries delayed the decision for three months,'
rendering any potential takeover implausible. Certainly, this was ample
time for Mineba to capitalize on the standard defense tactics uniquely
available to Japanese corporations threatened with the prospect of an
unfriendly takeover.'37
First, Takami Takahashi, Mineba's president, announced that it would
merge with Kanemori Company, a Tokyo apparel manufacturer. 3'
Second, Mineba's board approved another defensive strategy: a plan to
issue convertible bonds worth twenty-million shares into "friendly hands"
via a private placement.3 9 This increased Mineba's "stable stockholders"
to fifty-three percent, rendering any attempted takeover impossible."M
Trafalgar-Glen filed suit to prevent Mineba from merging with Kanemori,
but was rejected in a preliminary ruling by the Japanese court.' 4' Despite
131. see Misawa, supra note 9, at 787 n.5; Jennifer B. Hull, Trafalgar Holdings Weighs Its
Role in Japan Takeover Battle, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Sept. 2, 1985, at 24.
132. Coabb, supra note 24, at 123.
133. Toshio Shioanuea, A Few Foreign Firms Now Buying Into Japan, JAPAN ECON. J., May
20, 1989, at 3.
134. Cabb, supra note 24, at 123.
135. Shimmutu, supra note 133, at 3. Cada Rapoport& Frank Kane, Mineba Rebuff Hostile
Foreign Takeover Bid, FIN. TIMES, Oct 26,1985, § 1, at 1. The Japanese Ministry also viewed
the move by Trafalgar-Glen unfavorably because it did not believe that they offered the
necessary management skills to Mineba. /do
136. Id.
137. See Mergers andAcquisitions in Japan: Lifting a Barrier or Two, ECONOMIST, Aug. 12,
1989, at 68.
138. So Sorry Charlie, FORBES, July 14,1986, at 12; Mineba Uses Merger Defense. supra
note 128, at 28.
139. Mineba Uses Merger Defense, supra note 128;Japanese Takeovers: Shareholders Find
a Voice, supra note 117, at 28.
140. Mineba Uses Merger Defense, supra note 128, at 28.
141. WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 1986, § 1, at 35.
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the apparent injury
2 to Mineba's shareholders, the Nagana district court
ruled that the proposed merger was justified by legitimate business related
reasons.' Moreover, all of the major Japanese brokerage fims refused
to handle Trafalgar-Glen's takeover bid.' Interestingly, while both
Nomura Securities and Daiwa Securities, two of Japan's largest securities
houses,' refused to handle the bid, they were willing to handle Trafalgar-
Glen's sale of Mineba's stock'"
VI. THE DOUBLE STANDARD: As JAPANESE INTERESTS IN MERGERS
AND ACQUISITIONS GROW BOTH AT HOME AND ABROADBARRIERS TO
INWARD INVESTMENT BECOME MORE DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN
Japanese interest in mergers and acquisitions has been growing rapidly.
Japanese investment in United States corporate assets grew from approxi-
mately $2.6 billion in 1986 to nearly $6 billion in 1987.'
7 In 1988,
Japanese fins invested more than $14 billion into the United States in the
form of direct investments.'" Approximately $12.7 billion of that was
spent acquiring United States corporate assets in 130 takeovers and similar
transactions.
9 
This alarming growth in direct investment overseas
continues to accelerate.
Although Japan likes to point out that direct investment in Japan by
foreign companies has also continued to grow,"' it dwarfs in comparison
to the Japanese investment activity overseas. In 1989, Japanese companies
invested $67.5 billion overseas.'" By contrast, direct investment in Japan
by foreign companies has risen to a mere $2.8 billion.s For example,
142. Shareholders would, therefore, not benefit from an attempted takeover that would
normally cause an increase in stock price. Mergers and Acquisitions in Japan: Lifting a
harrier or Two, supra, note 137, at 68.
143. Crnbb, supra note 24, at 124.
144. Id.
145. Janet Bush, Tokyo Capital Markets: Life Insurance Companies Gather Know How. FIN.
TtMus, Mar. 14, 1988, at Vm.
146. See Trafalgar/Glen Partial Sale of Mineba, PR Newswire, April 23, 1986.
147. Id.
148. Gary Hector, Japan Learns the Takeover Game, FORTUNE, July 31, 1989, at 121.
149. Japanese Takeovers of U.S. Firms Continue at Fast Pace, Data Show, Daily Reportfor
Executives (BNA) No. 150 (Aug. 7. 1989) [hereinafter Japanese Takeovers of U.S. Firms].
150. Joe Joseph, Mighty MITI Comes to Europe on a Persuasive Mission, The TIMES
(London), Sept. 6, 1990 (Features Section).
151. Id.
152. ad
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cumulative Japanese investment in Britain reached $6.6 billion by year end
1989, while cumulative British investment in Japan reached only $518
million.5 During the same period, Japanese investment in the United
States amounted to approximately $32.5 billion, while United States
investment in Japan totalled $1.64 billion.1 4 Finally, by the third quarter
of 1989, total Japanese investment in the United States was valued at
nearly $76 billion by the United States Commerce Department.'55 The rise
is startling.
One reason for the growing interest in overseas acquisitions is that the
Japanese have more cash than they have places to invest it domestically.'
16
"Japan's knack for selling to the world, and the reluctance of its consumers
to buy imported products, has left the country with an unusual problem:
in 1988, the Japanese found themselves with $94 billion in surplus
cash."'" Japan has poured vast quantities of capital back into domestic
industries, $588 billion as compared with $576 billion spent by the United
States on its domestic industries, but many of their manufacturers are in
danger of having more capacity than they can use effectively. 58 This
trend, combined with the high value of the yen against the dollar,5 9 makes
it more difficult to export products because they are more expensive to
foreign countries. The United States' large market and high liquidity fuel
interest in overseas takeovers)to Moreover, growing fear about "protec-
tionism," threatening to shut out Japanese imports, generates further
interest in overseas acquisitions.6 Many industries are global in nature
and acquisitions are fueled by a fear of losing strategic positioning."
153. Id.
154. U.S.-Japanese tmes u nt Disparity To Be Discussed at S11 Follow-Up Talks. 7 Intl
Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 3, at 1235 (Aug. 8, 1990).
155. Clyde H. Famnswolth, U.S. Hardens Trade Stance With Japan, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 7,
1991, at DI.
156. Patricia Chisolm, Japan Shops the World, MACLEAN'S, Aug. 28, 1989, at 40.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Isaac Shapiro, etah,European Firms LeadJapanese in U.S. Takeovers, NA-'L L. J., Feb.
20, 1989, at S3. The "endaka," the high yen relative to the dollar, is diminishing the
competitiveness of many export-oriented Japanese companies, is one of the true dtving folces
behind the Japanese M&A interest in the United States. Id.
160. Japanese Takeovers of U.S. Firms, supra note 149.
161. Chits, supra note 120, at DI.
162. See Shapir, supra note 159, at 33; M&A-On the Prowl, But Slow to Pounce,
EUROMONEY, Mar. 1, 1989, at 23.
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Although the value of acquisitions of United States corporate assets
by Japanese investors declined somewhat in the first half of 1989, "the
wave of takeover activity shows no sign of abating."'" "Nearly two-thirds
of 917 major Japanese companies say that mergers and acquisitions are
strategically necessary for both diversification and acquisition of new
technology."'" "Conversely, measures to protect themselves from mergers
or acquisitions have been taken at 584 of the Japanese companies, and six
stipulate preventative measures in their by-laws."" A report prepared by
Yamaichi Securities Company asserted that the number of mergers and
acquisitions involving Japanese firms totaled 117 in the first quarter of
1989, of which 78 were directed at foreign companies."
There is widespread speculation that Japanese participation in takeover
activity can be expected to increase dramatically.
7 The concept of
mergers and acquisition has gained some respectability in recent years."
Harwo Kinoshita, chief manager of the mergers and acquisition department
at Mitsubishi Bank, has suggested that it will increase steadily rather than
explosively." In his words, "M&A is now no longer considered
shameful: It is a useful strategy.
"
tH
These acquisitions will take a variety of forms. Weary of a potential
backlash against Japanese investment in the United States,'
7 some will
163. M&A-On the Prowl But Slow to Pounce, supra note 162.
164. Japanese Firms'Interests in M & A is Growing, JAPAN ECON. J., Oct. 15, 1988, at 4.
165. Id.
166. Japanese Purchases of Foreign Firms Growing, Kyodo News Service, Apr. 11, 1989,
available in LExss, Nes Library, Intentahonal File.
167. Today the Friendly Offer, Tomorrow the Hostile Bid, EUROMONEY, Aug. 1989 at 48.
Japanese companies am poised to make overseas acquisitions on a sale that will astound, and
with an aggression that willmake nonsense of current beliefs about conporate Japan. Id Them
has been an explosion of books and articles written in Japanese on all aspects of mergers and
acquisitions, from how to do it, to who the players am and the costs and benefits of a merger
and acquisition. Shapiro et al., sapra note 159, at 53.
168. Japanese Corporate Finance, EuRoMONEY, Mar. 1990, at 31.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Chits, supra note 120, at D1. Recent investments and acquisitions by the Japanese
have sparked some alarm in the United States, raising questions about whether such transactioas
undermine national interests by strengthening Japan's competitive edge. Id. Japanese
companies, sensitive to such eoncems, am likely to taed carefully. Id. Recogniaing the
potential friction with the United States, Japan's Minisly of Finance has cautioned the Japanese
companies to proceed slowly. Id. Mr. Yamamoto of Sumitomo Bank has predicted that
Japanese companies would be more likely to try joint ventures rather than outright purchases.
Sherry R, Sontag, On Japan's Behalf, NAVrL L.J., Sept. 19,1988, at 1. The Japanese Government
is equesting that Japanese companies maintain a low profile because it fears a political
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INTL & COMP. L.
proceed more cautiously. They will take the form of more 'traditional"'
methods of doing business from a Japanese perspective by developing
relationships over a period of years. The Japanese may proceed by
building upon the hundreds of joint-ventures already established, and by
establishing many more as footholds for the future." These joint ventures
will give rise to full-scale acquisitions."4 One example is Sony's recent
acquisition of CBS records in March 1988." Sony was involved in a
joint venture with CBS records for ten years before it bought the company
for $2 billion."
More and more Japanese institutions are getting involved in
mergers and acquisitions. Japanese banks, security fins and
corporations are now actively developing M&A capabilities.
Many long-term lenders, such as the Industrial Bank of Japan
Ltd. and The Long Term Credit Bank of Japan Ltd., as well as
a number of city banks such as The Sumitomo Bank Ltd., The
Sanwa Bank Ltd., and the Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank Ltd, have
backlash from Americans who are concerned over foreign investment and the potential
economic dependency. Id. The Japanese are attempting to bypass what has traditionally been
called "Japan hashing." Gary Hector, Japan Learns the Takeover Game, FORTUNE, July 31,
1989, at 121. The Japanese willingness to take on partoers is one sure sign that they are more
confident in the world of mergers and acquisitions. Id. The rationale is partly defensive
because of the tremendous publicity of large Japanese acquisitions in the United States. Id.
Many Americans fear that the new wave of Japanese investment will lead to a "takeover- of
American resources, causing the United States to lose control over its economic destiny. Art
Pine, U.S., Japan in Quiet Fight Over Leadership Role, LA. TnMcS, Feb. 26, 1989, § 1, at 1.
With popular resentment of Japanese investment in the United States runing high after the
recent fluny of Japanese acquisitions, companies in Tokyo are searching for ways to reduce the
friction that these investnents cause. Marcus W. Bmuehli, Japanese Seek Low Profile in U.S.
Deals, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 1989, § 1, at 2.
172. Traditional in the sense that the Japanese typically go to great lengths to develop long
lasting, harmonious relationships. Ames, supra note 118, at 9. This is atypical, however,
because the Japanese traditionally view all hut friendly acquisitions as akin to "hijacking." Id.
173. Bmauchli, supra note 171, § 1, at 2. Some Japanese companies are considering
investment and business alliances with United States partners. Id.
174. M&A-On the Prowl, But Slow to Pounce, supra note 162, at 23. Japanese firms may
be unfolding a strategy of acquisition, starting with business tie-ups, and proceeding with joint
ventures toward ultimate control. Brauchli, supra note 171, § 1, at 2. Some Japanese
companies are devising new ways of structuring acquisitions, and they are tying harder to
explain their objectives. Id
175. See id.; Chir, supra note 161, at Dt.
176. See id
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established M&A departments with some degree of presence in
the United States as well.m
In July 1988, Nomura Securities Company, Japan's largest securities
house, bought a twenty percent stake in Wasserstein, Perella & Company,
one the most respected mergers and acquisitions firms in the United
States."' In Japan, Wasserstein Perella and Nomura have a joint venture
to elicit business from Japanese companies seeking acquisitions in Japan
or the United States. " The world's third largest bank, Fuji Bank Limited,
has also formed a joint venture with James D. Wolfensohn Incorporated,
a specialist in mergers and acquisitions, to advise on mergers and
acquisitions between American and Japanese companies." The new firm,
Fuji-Wolfensohn is chaired by former Federal Reserve Board Chairman,
Paul A. Volker."' In March 1989, it was reported that the major securities
companies in Japan were stepping up the expansion of mergers and
acquisitions capabilities, and the other leading brokerage firms are
expected to create independent mergers and acquisition departments as
well!"
Moreover, Japanese banks have become more involved in financing
mergers and acquisitions. In a recent battle between Time Incorporated
and Paramount Communications over Warner Communications, all United
States based corporations, the Industrial Bank of Japan, Dai-ichi Kangyo,
Mitsubishi, Sanwa, and Fuji banks extended lines of credit to back Time,
while Sumitomo and the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan financially
backed Paramount.'
Japanese life insurance companies have also been getting involved in
acquisitions.' In 1987, two of the top ten Japanese acquisitions in the
United States were Nippon Life Assurance's purchase of a stake in
Shearson Lehman Brothers (now Shearson Lehman Hutton), and Yasuda
177. Shapiro, supra note 159, at 53.
178. Steven K. Paulson, U.S. Course on Mergers and Acquisitions Draws Complaints, AP,
Aug. 1, 1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, AP File.
179. Leslie Wayne, 'Wasserlia' in Expansion Mode, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 23, 1988, § 3, at 5.
180. Fuji Bank, James D. Wolfensohn Form Joint Venture, AP, March 14, 1989, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AP File.
181. Id.
182. "Big Four" Brokers Pushing M&A business, Jiji Press Ticker Service, March 8,1989,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
183. Hostile Takeover Bid Changes Japan Rules, CHt. Tara., Aug. 27, 1989, at 11t.
184. Janet Blush, Tokyo Capital Markets: Life Insurance Companies Gather Know-How,
FIN. TtmEs, Mar. 14, 1988, at VIII.
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Mutual Life Insurance Company's purchase of a stake in Paine Webber."
Japanese insurance companies currently are barred from participating in the
Japanese securities markets, although they are anticipating a deregulation
that will permit them access to those securities markets in the future.l
Japanese law finms are also anticipating greater participation in the
mergers and acquisition business. Many major Japanese law firms have
been making it a practice to send young attorneys abroad to study and gain
experience in mergers and acquisitions."i Since 1987, foreign law firms
have been permitted to establish offices in Japan, many of whom offer
experience in mergers and acquisitions.'
Despite the growing interest and apparent preparation for future
participation in the mergers and acquisition business both at home and
abroad, te Japanese are still reluctant to engage in domestic acquisitions,
and the barriers to foreign investment remain. The Japanese actively have
participated in mergers and acquisitions overseas, but they refrain from
pursuing such activity on domestic turf." According to a 1988 survey
conducted by Yamaichi Securities, there were 555 Japanese acquisitions,
of which 315 were overseas." In 1989, Japanese enterprises carried out
a record 404 corporate takeovers of foreign companies, a twenty-two
percent increase from 1988.' ' On the other hand, there were only fifteen
foreign takeovers of Japanese companies by foreign concerns in 1989,
down from seventeen in 1988." The number of takeovers of Japanese
companies in which both parties were Japanese was much larger. There
were 240 takeovers of Japanese companies by Japanese companies having
a value of more than $1.5 billion.' This is more than double the total of
four years earlier, but still a fraction of the estimated $300 billion in
merger-and-acquisition deals transacted in the United States in 1988.'
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Shapiro, supra note 159.
188. Id.
189. Sally Solo, Boone Goes Hunting in Japan, FORTUNE, May 8, 1989, at 2.
190. Today the Friendly Offer, Tomorrow the Hostile Bid, supra note 167, at 48.
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A recent investment by the United States corporate takeover specialist
T. Boone Pickens has sparked great controversy in Japan. As of March
31, 1989, Mr. Pickens emerged as the largest shareholder of Koito
Manufacturing Company, an automotive-lighting equipment maker, with
a 20.2 % interest in the company.
t There had been speculation that Mr.
Pickens' ultimate goal was to greenmail"' Koito,'" but Mr. Pickens has
adamantly contested that the purchase was strictly for investment
purposes.'"
e The company initially refused to transfer the shares to Mr.
Pickens' name, claiming a false statement had been made in the reports he
submitted to the various ministries, but they eventually succumbed.' Mr.
Pickens then requested three seats on the board, the equivalent of those
held by Toyota Motor Corporation, which then held a nineteen percent
interest in Koito.
2
0' Although the Koito management denied Mr. Pickens'
request for seats, it did give one seat to Matsushita Electric, which held a
mere five-percent interest in Koito.
m  Mr. Pickens announced in
September 1989 that he had raised his stake in Koito to twenty-six percent
and again requested representation on the board.'rs Koito again refused to
yield to Mr. Pickens' request, stating that it did not have to give him a seat
simply because he has raised his stake to twenty-six percent.1 Mr.
Pickens also repeatedly tried to get the company's financial information,
but was fended off." He even tried to get a court order to force the
company to disclose its tax returns, but was again unsuccessful.' Koito
relentlessly frustrated Mr. Pickens' requests despite his inability to generate
196. Janice Fuhrman, Japanese Company Surprised by Pickens Stock Acquisition, AP, April
5, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AP File.
197. Greenmail is a term used to describe a method in which the hostile acquirer profits by
selling the target company's stock at a premium back to the company or another shareholder
friendly with the target company.
198. LA. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1989, § 4, at 2; see Stephan Wagstyl, Pickens Bursts in With All
Guns Blazing, FIN. TIMES, July 28,1989, § 1, at 25. The controversy surrounding Mr. Pickens'
accumulation of shares began when he bought a 20.2% stake in Koito from Mr. Kitam
Watanabe, a Japanese corporate raider. Id. They suspected that them may some repurchase
agreement between the two. lit
199. Solo, supra note 189, at 2.
200. Koito to Accept Share Transfer to Boone, Jiii Press Ticker Service, Apr. 18, 1989,
available in LsIS, Nexis Library, AP File.
201. Nancy Yoshihara, Pickens Grids for Showdown With Japanese Company, L.A. TIMES,
June 27, 1989, § 4, at 8.
202. id.
203. Pickens Raises Koito Stake, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1989, at D20.
204. NEWSDAY, Sept. 22, 1989, at 51.
205. Wagstyt, supra note 198, § 1, at 25.
206. Id.
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any major management changes even if his requests had been granted." '
As Mr. Pickens asserted, he posed no threat to the company's management
because the extensive interconnected or "stable" shareholders could easily
outvote him.' Nevertheless, Mr. Pickens continues to be denied board
representation even though he is Koito's largest shareholder."s
Although Mr. Pickens' recent investment indicates that the Japanese
perception of foreign acquisitions in Japan has changed little, it is
significant that increasing pressures for change have not been completely
disregarded.2"' Prior to agreeing to meet with Mr. Pickens, Koito
demanded that the MOF further investigate whether Mr. Pickens filed the
proper documentation.2" The Ministry's refusal to accommodate Koito's
request indicates that they may be sensitive to foreign criticism of the
"closed markets" in Japan.
1 2
A recent court decision further indicates that foreign pressures are
causing some change in Japan. In July, the Tokyo district court granted
the Japanese Shuwa Corporation an injunction to prevent two supermarket
chains, Chujitsua and Inageya, from diluting Shuwa's stake in the chains
by swapping new share issues at far below market price.2"3 The Court
ruled that issuing cut-price shares to friendly investors was unfair to
shareholders.1 4 The ruling requires approval by at least two-thirds of the
shareholders at a general meeting. 5' While it is unclear what kind of
precedent the ruling will set, it is an important step in removing barriers.
The ruling, while making the traditional Japanese takeover defense more
difficult, recognizes the rights of shareholders and alleviates some of the
obstacles confronting foreign investment.
16
It is likely that this decision also reflected the Japanese government's
concerns over the investment friction that characterized the Structural
207. It is unlikely that Pickens could make any major management changes with only one
seat, Or even a few Seats, on the board. Pickens would still have to convince a majority of the
board to implement such changes. In light of their relentless resistance to his requests thus far,
it would be a very unlikely scenario.
208. Japanese Economy Closed, Pickens Says, LA. TtMES, July 12, 1989, § 4, at 3.
209. Japan and MCA, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1990, at A14.
210. See generally Yoshiharm, supra note 201, § 4 at 8.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Analysts Prescribe More Mergers for Japan, CH. Tat., Aug. 25, 1989, at 4;
Schoenberger & Ctipello, supra note 117, at 6.
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Impediment Initiative ("SU1") talks between Japan and United States.
2
'
The SII negotiations specifically were initiated to address "unfair trade
practices" in Japan.
2 s Japan is being called upon to "dismantle its
structural barriers to trade--or suffer punitive countermeasures.""
9 The
SU talks are intended to lead to reform in both the United States and Japan
and make United States industry more competitive while opening Japan's
markets.
220
The SII was a series of discussions initiated to address the structural
elements of the Japanese and United States economies, which are often
implicated as major causes of the impediment to trade and investments.
22'
In the SI, the United States identified six areas as structural
barriers: the high Japanese savings rate, Japanese business
groups such as the keiretsu, land use policies that led to high land
prices in Japan, government tolerance of anticompetitive pricing
practices, the product distribution system, and the anticompetitive
pricing policies."'
Despite the SII negotiations, some policy experts predict that the
relationship between the United States and Japan is likely to get worse
instead of better."' Adding to an already strained relationship is the
217. See US.-Japanese Discuss Economies, spra note 103, at CI. The S1i talks, which
began September 6, 1989, were expected to be held every other month for the next yeaw. Id.
The primary focus of the discussions was to identify and remedy the root causes of the trade
imbalance. Id. The United States, weary of chipping away at Japan's trade imbalance with little
success, is demanding sweeping changes, calling upon Japua to "find a new way of doing
business." Id. One of the major topics to be discussed is Japan's business structure, marked
by interlocking shareholders, which discourages mergers and acquisitions. Id.
218. See Mergers andAcquisitions in Japan: Lifting aBarrieror Two, ECONOMIST, Aug 12,
1989, at 68; James Sterngold, U.S. Urged to Soften Japan Stand, N.Y. TINES, Nov. 25, 1989,
at A3 1. David C. Mulford, Under Secretary of the Treasury, recently criticized the Japanese
after the latest round of financial talks between the United States and Japan achieved little
progress, demanding that they pick up the pace of their financial liberalization. Id. But see
Berger, supra note 191, at Cl. Some analysts have indicated that the United States pressure has
begun to pay off. [d. United States investment in Japan has begun to grow, albeit, slowly. Id.
219. ld.; see also Art Pine, U.S Deadlines to Put Pressure on Japan in Talks, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 19, 1990, at 1.
220. Fred Hiatt, Japan Preparing Array of Trade Concessions: Proposals to Respond to
U.S. Complaints, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 1990, at Cl.
221. Hearing of the Joint Economic Committee Subject: Japan's Economic Challenge, FED.
INFO. Sys, Oct. 18, 1990 [hereinafter Japan's Economic Challenge].
222. Id.
223. SIl Talks, Super 301 Complaint Strain U.S.-Japanese Relations, Daily Rep. for
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INVL & COMP. L.
seemingly relentless United States trade deficit with Japan and Japan's
growing investment presence in the United States.
2 4
The early meetings of the SII negotiations in 1989 resulted in little
progress, and United States negotiators have expressed disappointment with
"a Japanese reluctance to negotiate." 2" Some American business leaders
and members of the Senate Finance Committee, although supporting the
SII talks, have questioned whether it can achieve tangible results.26 The
Bush Administration, however, has expressed confidence that the SII talks
will improve the United States-Japan trade relationship and reduce
structural imbalances.227 Support for such optimism may be found by the
Japanese govemment's indications that it would ease restrictions on foreign
investment and takeovers.22 It is also significant to note, however, that
the Japanese government has also confided that there may be little it could
do to break up Japan's big corporate groups (the keiretsu) and restrict
cross-ownership of stock.229 Progress in the SI talks likely provided a
benchmark for the Bush Administration as the June 16, 1990 "Super 301"
deadline approached.220 Super 301 is the familiar phrase that characterizes
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 - the amendment
to section 301 of the United States Trade Act of 1974." ' Although the
Super 301 exercise was not directed solely at Japan (India and Brazil were
also cited as maintaining unfair trade practices), it raised the question of
what the United States should do vis-a-vis Japan, particularly if the SII
negotiations ultimately prove unproductive.232
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Super 301 required the United States Trade Representatives to identify
in May 1989, and again in April 1990, those countries that were the most
egregious participants of major unfair trade practices.3 This is intended
to exert more pressure on the President to respond to any unfair trade
practices and policies of foreign governments.
24 
The terms "Super 301"
and "mandatory retaliation" have come to synonymously refer to the
proposed amendments.
23 
The 1988 Omnibus Trade Act requires the Bush
Administration to launch proceedings against countries that refuse to allow
United States' goods and services to compete.? "It virtually mandates
retaliation if negotiations fail to produce a solution within thirteen
months."
7
The Japanese government is keenly aware of the sentiment expressed
by many government officials and businessmen in the United States and
has indicated that it will make efforts to open its markets, but Japanese
officials also warn that it will not be intimidated by threats.? In a rare
demonstration of candor, Makoto Utsumi, the Vice Minister of Finance for
International Affairs in Japan, recently warned that if the United States
applied sanctions against Japan it would create a "very harmful situa-
tion."' Although it has frequently been speculated that sanctions by the
United States against Japan could lead to Japanese reprisals in its financial
sector, it is considered particularly unusual for a top Japanese treasury
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official to be so blunt.' Many scholars, legislators and businessmen in
the United States have raised questions about the extent to which heavy
reliance on foreign investment limits the flexibility of our economic
policymakers to negotiate and establish policies." Japanese investors
were one of the biggest suppliers of capital to the United States economy
in the 1980s.'
2  
It has come to be accepted that the massive Japanese
investments in United States treasury bonds has been one of the primary
forces keeping America afloat.' The largest portion of Japanese
investment in the United States has been in portfolio investments, such as
United States government securities, corporate stocks and bonds, and bank
deposits.' Japanese investments in United States government securities
have helped to finance directly the growing federal budget deficit.
245 
In
the past, the Japanese have usually purchased up to forty percent of the
treasury bonds auctioned.' This causes great consternation, chiefly
because of the potential consequences for the United States financial
markets and economy if the Japanese suddenly were to withdraw from
investing in the United States.' For example, many stock market analysts
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The Japanese have recently slashed their holdings of foreign bonds in 1990 to the lowest level
in six years because of higher domestic interest rates and a stronger yen. Id This trend could
have serious repercussions for the United States because the diminished Japanese appetite for
foreign bonds threatens to curtail what has been a crucial source of financing for the United
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have attributed significant drops in the stock market to concerns that
foreign investors might decrease their investments in the United States.'
The scramble for capital means that Washington's efforts to
control the U.S. economy are increasingly at the mercy of
decisions made in Tokyo, Bonn, and Riyadh. Because of it,
dependence of foreign capital, Washington will be forced to try
to influence the economic policy decisions of other countries.
And U.S. foreign and military policy will have to fashioned with
an eye on how it may influence foreigner's investment deci-
sions."
'9
In the past, the United States had powerful leverage over Tokyo's
policies. It could threaten to close the United States markets to Japanese
investors or, during the Cold War, remove the United States security
umbrella from Japan.? Such threats ring hollow today. Some have even
taken the extreme position that foreign investment in the United States
may very well mean that the sovereignty over our economic future is at
risk.? Indeed, in his recent unusual display of outspokenness, Mr. Utsumi




Nonetheless, recent developments indicate that pressures for reform
have made some leeway in reducing the barriers to foreign investment in
Japan. In October 1989, a small crack appeared in what critics have
termed the "invisible wall" of barriers against foreign investment in
Japan." Executives of Polly Peck International, a fast growing British-
based finm, and Sansui Electric Company, a Japanese multinational
electronics company, announced that the British conglomerate would
acquire a fifty-one percent controlling interest in Sansui.a The purchase
will make Sansui the only Japanese company listed on the Tokyo Stock
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Exchange to be controlled by foreign interests." The acquisition was
heralded by Japanese officials who have been besieged with complaints
about Japan's unwillingness to offer reciprocity to foreign investors.2
6
Michael Hutchinson, a director of mergers and acquisitions at Yamaichi,
responded:
It could not have happened three years ago. The significance of
this transaction is that it marks a shift in the attitude of the
Japanese authorities. If the MOF or MITI had wanted to block
the acquisition of a domestic finn by a foreign purchaser, they
would have found some pretext. But they were open, helpful
and, in fact, welcomed the transaction
'
Although some have viewed Polly Peck's acquisition as a landmark
transaction, it has not been free of criticism.?" Many foreign analysts
have been less optimistic and indicate that Polly Peck was permitted to
break the taboo only because Sansui's rivals and Japanese bankers thought
that the company was too sick to salvage." They view the sparse merger
and acquisition activity that occur in Japan as little more than rescue
operations of companies on the verge of bankruptcy-like Sansui.o
°
Those criticizing the deal maintain that foreign purchases of major,
healthy Japanese firms remains virtually impossible, despite a lack of
"official barriers." The Japanese are happy to foist off an occasional ailing
company, but will continue to prevent foreigners from acquiring successful
domestic finns.n
Just how much of a precedent this transaction will set is likely to be
determined in the near future; however, it may be significant to note that
Polly Peck's courtship of Sansui was accompanied with a big advantage.'
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The President of Polly Peck's Taiwan-based Capetronic division, Chico
Ko, is half Japanese, and he was educated in Japan.' Moreover, he
opened a Capetronic office in Tokyo in 1972.' Mr. Ko was a key factor
in the negotiations between Polly Peck and Sanaui;' his intimate
knowledge of Japanese culture and business significantly enhanced Polly
Peck's successful conclusion of the transaction.
Despite the criticism surrounding the acquisition, it is nevertheless a
significant step toward a more relaxed takeover environment. Further
measures are evidenced by the Japanese Governments recent decision to
aid foreign investors. By providing access to its data base on plant sites
across the nation, they hope to encourage foreigners to establish businesses
in Japan.' MITI has also compiled a guide on investment in Japan,
which it has distributed to approximately 500 non-Japanese companies.'
6
'
The guide contains ease studies on approximately 100 foreign companies
successfully investing in Japan.? Although it is not directed at foreign
acquisition of Japanese companies, it indicates that Japanese attitudes are
changing.?
A significant measure aimed at easing takeover rules was announced
recently by the MOF.cx An advisory subcommittee of Japan's Security
and Exchange Council approved a MOF plan to ease restrictions on
takeover bids.
27
' Although the plan requires greater disclosure, the purpose
of the new rules is to relax takeover bid requirements and to provide more
information to investors.
2  
Under the new system, the ten-day advance
notice to the MOF, which is currently required, will be abolished.?
73 
The
only requirement will be a newspaper announcement and a report to the
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VII. CONCLUSION
The development of corporate merger and acquisition activity has
received considerable international attention. For some time, the Japanese
have been taking advantage of investment opportunities on a global scale,
but investment opportunities in Japan are still quite limited for foreign
investors. As the Japanese get more involved in mergers and acquisitions,
both at home and abroad, it will become more difficult for them to
rationalize the restrictions on foreign investment in Japan. Frequently
relied upon explanations or justifications, such as cultural or structural
extra-legal barriers, will no longer suffice.
Foreign pressure on Japan continues,"
5 
and it is likely that change will
occur only through international pressure. Japan's resistance to foreign
investment was at one time an understandable response to the unprecedent-
ed destruction it incurred during World War II; Japan received little debate
in view of its need to rebuild and restructure its economy. Because Japan
is now recognized as an economic superpower this resistance has sparked
great controversy in recent years." The revised Foreign Exchange and
Foreign Trade Control Law moderately has addressed some of the de jure
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restrictions on foreign investment in Japan-but it falls far short of the
reciprocity demanded by international critics. Although recent develop-
ments indicate that progress finally has begun, the degree of change is
likely to be a topic of heated debate in the upcoming years. One thing,
however, stands clear: until the de facto barriers are relaxed, foreign
acquisitions in Japan will remain limited.
J. Robert MacAneney

